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Abstract 
Drawing on Jean Baudrillard’s approach and his process of simulation, which is a 
useful key for interpreting and analysing the natural body-artificial body dichotomy, 
this article aims to raise questions about the repercussions that the new culture of the 
body and the practices associated with the medicalization of maternity have on the 
construction of personal and social identity. The debate encompasses issues in the 
realm of bioethics, the presence or absence of human rights, contractual exchange, the 
processes of commodification of the body, women and pregnancy, and processes that 
manipulate human life.  
The scope of the observations thus extends to subjects such as bioethics, body 
ownership and the manipulation of life, to the point of questioning the construction 
of gender identity and even the very concept of mother.  
The objective of this study is to render the complexity of the issue of surrogacy 
and highlight the resulting theoretical challenges faced by the social sciences. It is still 
essentially exploratory in nature and is intended as a starting point for the 
development of this research topic, raising certain questions in an attempt to provide 
the sociological debate with new theoretical and empirical challenges.  
Keywords: surrogacy, simulacrum, artificial body, surrogate mother. 
1.  Introduction 
Individuals have become overloaded with responsibilities towards 
themselves as a result of social instability caused by rapid change and the 
destruction of fixed points of reference in their lives, with a subsequent loss of 
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the traditional historical continuity (Beck, 2000) and the disappearance of 
symbolic and normative references (Crespi, 2004; Pulcini, 2001). This has 
transformed the construction of the self into a rootless process that develops 
in unstable random steps. As Bauman states (1998), the points of reference in 
our world are attached to wheels in motion, as identity is no longer a pre-
established permanent condition. Instead, it has become the result of an 
increasingly individualized task (Crespi, 2004); work on the self is now seen as 
a personal project. 
The privatization of everyday battles has made individuals more and 
more responsible for their choices (Bauman, 2002) in a process that 
encourages self-care and attention focused on personal lifestyle behaviour, 
thereby creating an implosion mechanism between the world of health and the 
consumer world. The imperfection of a body, which actually defines its unique 
nature, has to be obliterated in the quest for a body without limits or flaws. As 
individuals refuse to live with their bodily weaknesses (MacIntyre, 2001), 
bodies are increasingly subject to modification. Just as diseases are contained 
or eradiated, so must shortness, ugliness and obesity – to name but a few 
phenomena – be expunged as bona fide disabilities (Sandel, 2007). 
Relentlessness towards the body by purging it of imperfections is an 
individual’s attempt at self-improvement.  
This forms the backdrop for surrogacy, which is an example of an 
instrument aimed at overcoming bodily limits, in this case in terms of the 
inability to conceive children. 
In this respect, surrogacy has altered the concept of the (biological) 
human body in its anatomical conformation with certain implications in the 
field of culture. In particular, the practice has changed the concept of the body 
by revealing the natural body-artificial body dichotomy. The former is defined 
as a body that is naturally able or unable to become pregnant, while the latter 
is the surrogate mother’s body that experiences the pregnancy. 
If we assume that all forms of assisted procreation are an attempt to 
defeat infertility and overcome the limit of being unable to conceive a child 
naturally, do these techniques help to create an artificial body?  
The result of this process is a ‘new’ body. On one hand, there is one’s 
own body, whose flaws the individual strives to remove (using assisted 
procreation techniques), while on the other hand there is someone else’s body 
(in cases of surrogacy). In this way, as in virtual reality, where the dominant 
reality crumbles and is revived under the effect of simulation, the body is 
transformed into a new artificially produced body. How much distance is 
there between the body that conceives and the natural body? 
In keeping with the thinking of Baudrillard, one of the leading 
sociologists in the analysis of the virtual world and the process of simulation, 
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to what extent does the body that ‘we create ourselves’ remain the ‘original 
body’ and to what extent does it eliminate the original form? 
2.  The simulacrum as a performing form and the artificial body. The 
theoretical point of view 
Guided by the concept of the simulacrum, Jean Baudrillard provided an 
interpretation of postmodern manifestations of the dominance of the virtual 
and the artificial.  
In Baudrillard’s perspective, the fundamental dichotomy that made it 
possible to assess the authenticity of every relationship is no longer valid. This 
lack of a connection between true and false is the key for interpreting and 
explaining the social changes underway, the result of the development of the 
world of communication and technology (Baudrillard, 1996, 2007; Kellner, 
2007, Bellasi, 1977).  
The cornerstone of the process of simulation – the elimination of the 
original that gives rise to the simulacrum – causes the implosion of the false 
copy, the reproduced copy, and its original referent, thereby leading to the 
collapse of the boundaries separating the true (the real) from the false (its 
copy) (Baudrillard, 1974, 1977, 2007; Klossowsky, 1981).  
According to Baudrillard, the process of simulation is a special 
mechanism of reproduction in which the reproduced copy is created as soon 
as the original takes shape, the starting point of the whole reproduction 
process. This aesthetic equivalence and temporal simultaneity between the 
original and the copy result in the absorption and assimilation of the original.  
The implosion between original elements and artificial elements – or real 
and virtual elements – leads to the birth of a new world in which it is no 
longer possible to distinguish between what is true and what is false. 
Individuals find themselves immersed in ambiguous situations where the 
traditional paradigms of knowledge, identity and relationship need to be 
redefined. The evanescent nature of the concept of the simulacrum makes it 
turn inwards, becoming an interpretive matrix for understanding the irreality 
and indeterminacy of postmodern phenomena.  
The perspective propounded over the years and the result of personal 
research reflections (Secondulfo, 2007; Viviani, 2008; 2014; Secondulfo, 
Viviani, 2017) is that simulacra are the product of a social process of reality 
construction operating through special organizational forms – mainly in terms 
of culture and the social construction of reality – that shape and mould 
elements of the socially constructed and shared reality. These are symbolic 
generative structures, consolidated models, which stamp reality with the 
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characteristic features of their image, thereby producing structural homologies, 
formal analogies, of content and meaning in all objects produced through 
their filter in this process.  
In this context, Baudrillard’s legacy is important to us because when the 
simulacrum is seen as a process, it acts as a bridge or filter in the connection 
between the manifestation of different spheres of social action and the 
structural homology that forms and interconnects them.  
The body and the current incessant work on the body complies with the 
logic of the simulacrum expounded by Baudrillard. In the same way that 
simulation is a process that strives to control impulsional chaos by eliminating 
limits and flaws, work on the body now aims to expunge diseases, disabilities 
and imperfections in order to enhance its performance.  
While the concept of the simulacrum implies the construction of an 
artificial hyperreal reality, which is even more real than the real as it is purged 
of flaws, work on the body invokes the creation of an artificial body aiming 
for perfection.  
This is an attempt to restore a self-image akin to a perfect body. This 
perfection changes from one performance to another, the promise of 
perfection revealed by science, but at the same time quashes our uniqueness, 
which is also a product of our limits (Sandel, 2007). 
3.  Natural body and artificial body. The case of surrogacy: aspects for 
investigation 
The original aim of exerting control over the body in this way is to 
strengthen it, to the point of removing all physical and/or emotional limits. 
This new personal work on the body is used for communication of the self. 
An individual’s corporeality reveals their lifestyle, personality, desires and 
values; it is the vehicle used to express intentionality in the world and towards 
the world (Turner, 2002; Galimberti, 2006). This encourages individuals to 
turn inwards and focus on themselves as single irrefutable points of reference, 
with a subsequent process of individualization in accordance with the new law 
of I am I (Beck, 2000). In this way, there is fresh emphasis on the person as a 
place of refuge from social uncertainty and a place of personal freedom.  
The value of the process is absolutized as it is the expression of self-
referential subjectivity (Le Breton, 2004, 2007). By emphasizing corporeality, 
the radicalization of the principle of autonomy leads to a redress over the 
body, whereby the individual has the absolute right of ownership and is now 
free to act on it and with it as is seen fit. 
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It is an attempt to create a personal self and find self-assurance in other 
bodies with the aim of building our own physicality, a personal external 
representation that covers over limits and defects. It is an attempt to improve 
our ego to the detriment of our identity and true face in the search for what 
we would like to be. Is it necessary to race from one performance to another 
behind an identity without its own face in order to rediscover one’s own being? 
(Baudrillard, 2007).  
The current goal is a lifestyle in which the body has to be immune to 
disease in order to aim for success. The individual’s objective and task is 
therefore to adapt their body to the social expectations and social ideals put 
forward by the consumer world. All this forces the individual to ask continual 
corrective questions on the basis of a concept of active corporeality.  
This mechanism forms the context for the current process of the 
medicalization of society (Conrad, 2007), which consists of: 
1. a different vision of daily life, which is now an object of treatment; 
2. a continuous drive for wellbeing with the development of a genuine 
performance culture, with a view to additive wellbeing.  
The aesthetic image has a positive impact on the individual’s 
psychological realm, increasing self-esteem by working on the emotional front 
that determines their current state of wellbeing (health). The idea of the body 
as a biological simulacrum, mentioned by Galimberti (2006), which is relevant 
to the anatomical structure of the biomedical perspective, is replaced by the 
body as an emotional simulacrum, a perceptive simulacrum. Individuals now 
define their state of health and/or illness by themselves through self-
perception. As a receptor of sensations, an individual’s level of wellbeing and 
health is established by the quality and degree of perception of the sensations 
they experience and perceive. Happiness becomes the equivalent of salvation 
and the myth of happiness now gathers and embodies the myth of equality in 
our society (Baudrillard, 1974). 
Appearance thus becomes the individual’s very identity (Le Breton, 2007), 
being transformed from facade and artificiality into self-manifestation.  
Cosmetic surgery and diets are two examples of body modification 
dictated by the illusion of being able to assume control over it, which has been 
further strengthened by the development of biomedical technology. Having 
control over the experiences of birth and death, individuals believe that they 
can avoid situations that are not recognized ‘as theirs’, because they are 
circumstances that highlight their limits and transience such as death, illness, 
old age and infertility (Russo, 2008a; Teman, 2003). 
Expecting the body to be something that can be acted on instrumentally 
and systematically means reducing it to an event that can change on a constant 
basis through transformations that would be different in terms of time, 
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method and appearance if they were left to express themselves freely in accordance 
with nature. These choices spell out the dream of self-determination to make 
one’s own decisions and have full control over events with a level of 
impatience that leads to the rejection of such bodily limits, which reveal a 
personal deficit rather than a superficial bodily deficit (Russo, 2008a, 2008b).  
By pondering these aspects and wondering to what extent mothers and 
others involved perceive a link or a detachment between the natural 
dimension and the virtual realm, the consideration can be broadened to 
include a variety of other elements. The new culture of the body aimed at 
overcoming its limits provides the context for medically-assisted fertilisation 
techniques and surrogate motherhood. The realm of body improvement 
serves as a backdrop to the thoughts of surrogacy presented below, as the 
technique features a body other than the original one – an artificial body – 
used to conceive a child.  
Elly Teman’s study (2003) highlights that even surrogate mothers 
themselves perceive their bodies as simple instruments, stating that they 
become artificial bodies during the pregnancy: ‘It is not mine. It is all artificial.’ 
(Teman, 2003). 
Surrogacy and assisted procreation in general create a distinction between 
gestating mother, genetic mother and social mother that fundamentally 
undermines the very concept of mother (Ragoné, 1994; Boccia and Zuffa, 
1998; Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum, Golombok, 2003; Ragoné, 1994; 
Moneti Codignola, 2008). 
In this respect, the distinction between natural body and artificial body 
widens the debate to include other related dichotomies.  
1. Genetic maternity vs. gestational maternity; 
2. Biological maternity vs. social maternity. 
The current debate on surrogacy involves issues from areas such as 
bioethics, the presence or absence of human rights, contractual exchange, the 
processes of the commodification of the body, women and pregnancy, and 
processes of manipulating human life. As this subjectivity is not found in the 
individual owner of the body (Boccia, Zuffa, 1998), we need to ask to what 
extent these techniques create a body that is no longer natural, as it is different 
from the original starting point of the natural mother’s body. 
In the spectrum that includes therapeutic intervention on infertile 
mothers and surrogacy, the natural body – the mother’s original body – is 
subjected to a process of transformation. This change features progressive 
distancing from the mother’s natural body, reaching its culmination in the 
body of another woman, the surrogate mother. 
The dichotomy between natural body and artificial body established by 
the process of the commodification and medicalization of the body highlights 
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the necessity for more profound reflection, as it raises other issues that need 
to be explored.  
These considerations will be developed over the course of this study by 
posing various questions with different ethical and moral values that emerge 
from the complex debate on surrogacy (Charlesworth, 1996). 
In particular, what repercussions do the new culture of the body and 
practices connected to the medicalization of maternity have on the personal 
and social construction of gender identities, the family and the very concept of 
mother? These questions arise from the theoretical perspective presented 
herein that analyses surrogacy through the natural body-artificial body 
dichotomy. As they are exploratory in nature and given the complexity of the 
matter, they make no claim to completeness. 
3.1 Body ownership 
Medically assisted fertilisation techniques and surrogacy presuppose the 
presence of a new body, whether it belongs to the surrogate mother or the 
biological mother, using special treatment in the latter case to overcome the 
inability of the body to conceive a child.  
Underlying both cases is a woman’s right to act on her body in complete 
freedom as she is its sole owner. 
Should an infertile mother – an intended mother – be free to use any 
available means to transcend the limits that nature and/or God (from a more 
religious perspective) imposed on her? If the body is an individual’s exclusive 
property, how much can they modify it? Are there any limits on the action 
that can be taken?  
To this end, Sandel (2007) stresses that there may be an extremely thin 
dividing line between treatment and improvement. For example, there are no 
restrictions on intervention when the aim is to prevent the physical and 
genetic problems that can affect foetuses and newborn babies. If this is 
considered legitimate, how should we view intervention that focuses on 
manipulating character traits such as temperament, patience and so on? Is 
there any difference in value between technology used to cure and technology 
used to improve or perfect? Where is the boundary line beyond which we act 
above and beyond nature? And when can actions be defined as against nature?  
In the case of a surrogate mother, where the body is perceived as a virtual 
body, an instrument whose aim is to realize another mother’s desire, we need 
to consider how much freedom of action the surrogate mother has towards 
her body. The body becomes the individual’s property, so she can freely 
decide to donate (or sell) to carry the pregnancy to term for others (Anleu, 
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1990, 1992). If this is the case, does the surrogate mother have total freedom 
of decision and action towards her body, or are there limits? 
3.2 Health and/or beauty? 
The demand for these forms of intervention is specialized, moving away 
from general medicine towards areas that involve economic exchange and 
typical consumer world strategies. In this context, the woman or couple is not 
given a gift, but above all an act of manipulation or instrumentalization of the 
body. 
As mentioned above, these assisted procreation techniques are part of the 
process of medicalization that includes some operations of a more medical 
nature and others that are more cosmetic. If overcoming the limits of the 
body and its infertility allows individuals to feel better and achieve wellbeing, 
how far removed is this from techniques (such as cosmetic surgery) that 
enable improvements to our bodies and therefore to ourselves? 
Considering assisted procreation as an ‘artificial’ intervention means 
changing the cultural, psychological, social and economic dimensions that are 
usually connected to natural pregnancy. From a sociological point of view, 
procreation is not only a biological fact, but a relationship that involves 
various social subjects: mother, father, family and child.  
Like any form of intervention to improve the body, the technique per se 
does not raise any moral dilemmas. What foregrounds the ethical question is 
the fact that a baby and other social figures are involved in the project to 
overcome bodily limits and search for perfection (Di Nicola, 2017). 
3.3 The concept of family 
Medically assisted procreation oversteps the boundaries of traditional 
parenting, opening up the prospect of new forms of parenthood (Cassano, 
2000; Di Nicola, 2017). 
Surrogacy and medically assisted fertilisation techniques have triggered 
changes that have altered the very notion of parenting (Donati, 1999; Naldini, 
2016). Thanks to the opportunities to intervene in matters of sterility and 
procreation, natural and biological limits can be overcome, with the 
consequent separation of sexuality and procreation. This distinction also 
creates a division in couple identity, defined as two people united by reciprocal 
feeling, by their identity as parents.  
This natural/artificial polarisation modifies the distinction between 
procreation mediated or unmediated by the social functions of the family (Di 
Nicola, 2017). Above all in the case of surrogacy, conception and pregnancy 
become an action no longer tied to the family or mediated by it; they are no 
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longer a choice that only involves the couple (Donati, 1999). Indeed, in this 
case the intersubjectivity of the family unit – which traditionally consists of 
two people – calls for a third subject. The moment of procreation becomes 
the result of a situation of maximum control, when conception and pregnancy 
should actually be a moment of minimum control. 
In this context, with the traditional image of parenting undermined, it is 
necessary to redefine the boundaries of the ‘new’ family created. For example, 
questions could be asked about the surrogate mother’s potential role within 
the ‘intended’ family unit. Can surrogacy be inserted into the family unit, and 
if so must it be included? If the surrogate mother’s involvement is accepted, 
the relationship inevitably no longer involves only two people and a new 
family reality is created. At the same time, if it is felt that the surrogate mother 
must be totally extraneous to the family dynamics, we might ask whether this 
is fair to the baby and the biological mother. 
3.4 The concept of family 
In the case of surrogacy, there is an unequal relationship starting from the 
primary relationship with the mother, which does not even seem to be 
clarified by the law (Boccia, Zuffa, 1998). Considered as distinct entities, the 
foetus and the woman are either seen as autonomous, as if they were separate, 
or the foetus is seen as the biological mother’s property as it is contained in 
her body. Both of these cases feature denial of the reality sui generis of the 
foetus and its intracorporeal relationship with its mother (Boccia, Zuffa, 1998; 
Jadva, Imrie, 2014).  
If there is an ownership issue regarding newborn babies, then their 
position within the family that has ‘sought’ them could also be questioned. 
Furthermore, what rights does the surrogate mother have with regard to the 
baby? If she does not have any, the resulting prospect is very similar to the 
market world, where the surrogate mother ‘sells’ the baby created and waives 
any rights to it. In keeping with a consumer logic that reduces everything to 
goods for satisfying the human search for wellbeing, happiness and self-
fulfilment, even children could become an object of trade.  
A baby has the right to a family identity and a human and social 
environment to identify with. However, in this case a biological/genetic 
identity different from the family identity also enters into the equation. 
Moreover, the opportunity that parents have to ‘commission’ their children 
‘from others’ cancels out the natural character of conception and pregnancy 
and destroys the dividing line separating therapeutic mechanisms for 
investigating and preventing possible genetic diseases from mechanisms that 
make it possible to choose a child’s physical characteristics. This seems to 
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violate a child’s right to autonomy, because they cannot be totally free if they 
are planned. Traditionally, we choose our friends, boyfriends, girlfriends, 
husbands and wives, but do not select our children, who have an 
unforeseeable set of characteristics and qualities.  
This impetus to master and control the mystery of birth replicates typical 
market dynamics, underlining the process of the commodification of the 
body, pregnancy, birth and even the baby. 
4.  Conclusions 
Surrogacy is an illegal practice in many countries, while it is only allowed 
for altruistic purposes and not in its commercial form in some states and 
practised legally in others. The debate on this technique and assisted 
procreation techniques in general, which have always been a subject of interest 
in the legal field, now plays a central role in sociological reflections. As this 
contribution has attempted to show, the issue is no longer purely rooted in the 
medical sphere and the social aspect is now included in the areas of analysis. 
The main aim of this article has been to demonstrate that these practices form 
part of the general and complex context of the medicalization and 
commodification of the body, at the same time highlighting certain ethical and 
moral implications that do not emerge from the other ways in which 
individuals practice body modification. 
In the context of the view of the simulacrum as a performing form 
(Secondulfo, 2007; Viviani, 2008; Secondulfo and Viviani, 2017), techniques 
that attempt to overcome a woman’s infertility evoke the concept of 
hyperreality, seen as the creation of a reality that eliminates the imperfections 
and flaws of the original reality. In this case, to be more precise, these 
practices can be interpreted using the simulacrum as an analysis filter, a search 
mechanism for the ‘best possible body’. 
In terms of performance culture, the woman (or couple) pursues the goal 
of overcoming natural limits through therapeutic intervention or surrogacy.  
The polarity between the natural body and the virtual body questions 
traditional aspects that the human sciences have often addressed, including 
body ownership, the separation of medicine and cosmetics (if it still exists), 
the traditional concept of family and, with specific regard to surrogacy, the 
nature of the relationship between baby and biological mother1 and/or genetic 
mother2. 
                                                     
1 The intended mother in cases of surrogacy. 
2 The surrogate mother. 
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The new role assumed by the body, with its commodification and new 
reflective power, has highlighted the ambiguity of the natural body-artificial 
body dichotomy. This relationship is reflected in the process of the 
medicalization of maternity, opening up the debate to include issues such as 
bioethics, contractual exchange, body ownership and the manipulation of life, 
to the point of questioning the construction of gender identity and even the 
very concept of mother.  
Indeed, surrogacy features three different figures: 
1. The genetic mother; 
2. The biological mother; 
3. The social mother. 
How well defined are these figures and how different are they from each 
other? 
If the term mother, in the sense of the ability to procreate, identifies the 
area of the female identity and condition that is clearly distinct from the male 
realm, can we still use it in the case of a biological (intended) mother? And if 
so in which terms? 
Furthermore, if the word mother indicates a bond, not only in terms of 
blood ties but also intimacy with the child, to what extent is a purely genetic 
mother really a mother? Is it right to define her as a surrogate mother?  
As outlined above, the aim of this study is to express the complexity of 
the issue of surrogacy and, in general, medically assisted fertilization and 
highlight the resulting theoretical challenges faced by the social sciences. 
These reflections derive from a perspective that focuses on the specific debate 
on the body paradox (natural-artificial). For this reason, the questions that 
have emerged are still essentially exploratory in nature and cannot hope to 
provide an exhaustive account considering the complexity of the subject. They 
attempt, however, to enhance the sociological debate with new theoretical and 
empirical challenges. 
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